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LEMMA
Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée

SÉMINAIRE

VOTING RULES AND STRATEGIC COORDINATION: EVIDENCE FROM REAL-WORLD PREFERENCE DISTRIBUTIONS - YAQIAN ZHANG

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Abstract:
This research compares the vulnerability of different voting rules to strategic coordination using real-world voter preference distributions. Using data from 200 elections in the CSES Dataset, it compares Plurality, Approval Voting, Two-Round Voting, Majority Judgment, and Evaluative Voting. The analysis examines which alternative candidates can become winners as voters are gradually allowed to move further from their sincere ballots, and how the minimum coalition required to change the outcome evolves. The results show that voting rules with similar overall manipulability can still differ substantially in the amount of individual ballot adjustment and

collective coordination required.